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PRIOR RESTRAINT AND CENSORSHIP: ACKNOWLEDGED
OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS FOR GOVERNMENT SCIENTISTS
TODD STEDEFORD*
INTRODUCTION
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances.
-U.S. CONST. AMEND. I
The Founders designed the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution as retaliation against the requirement of prepublication
clearance by the government.' Although the government may still impose
a level of restriction on speech, the courts determine the level of scrutiny
to be imparted on those restrictions.2 Based on the communicative con-
tent, content-based restrictions imposed by the government may remove
speech from the purview of the First Amendment, or may trigger various
degrees of protection for the speech depending on the message conveyed
to listeners or the possible consequences that may stem from the mes-
sage.3 For instance, restrictions on the following types of speech are per-
missible: false statements of fact, obscenity, child pornography, offensive
speech, threats, and speech owned by others.4 The presumption remains
that if a restriction is placed on speech outside the exceptions, the
restriction is invalid.'
* The author, an employee of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), devel-
oped the research described herein on his own time. It was conducted independent of
EPA employment and has not been subjected to the Agency's peer and administrative
review. The conclusions and opinions drawn are solely those of the author and are not
necessarily the views of the Agency.
I EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES
AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 1 (2d ed. 2005).
2id.
Sld.
4 Id. at 3, 59, 114, 131, 147, 171, and 185.
5 Id. at 224.
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However, these types of restricted speech do not define the bound-
aries of free speech among individuals, including scientists, within the
government. Cases of prior restraint and outright censorship of science
are increasingly being identified.6 Regrettably, restrictions on freedom
of scientific speech infect not only regulatory agencies such as the En-
vironmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), where a taunt leash may be held
by the governing administration, but also purely research-based branches
of government like the National Institutes of Health and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.'
With regard to political or commercial speech, a restriction may
be subject to either strict scrutiny or diminished protection, respectively,
by the reviewing court.8 Under strict scrutiny review, a restriction will
only be upheld if it is "narrowly tailored" to a "compelling state interest."'
This level of scrutiny has been routinely applied to political speech.1 °
Similarly, a restriction will be upheld under diminished protection re-
view if: 1) "the restriction is justified by a substantial government inter-
est;" 2) "it directly advances this interest;" and 3) "it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest."" This level of review is applied
to commercial speech.' 2 Finally, restrictions on the "time, place, or man-
ner of speech are permissible if they ... [a]re justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech (i.e., are content-neutral), ...
[slerve a substantial government interest,... [and aire narrowly tailored
to serve this interest."'3
Scientific speech has remained somewhat of an enigma as to the
level of protection it should be afforded from government-imposed restric-
tions. Behind this critical inquiry is the lawfulness of speech restrictions
by the government as a sovereign or as an employer of government scien-
tists. This latter category is particularly problematic when restrictions
are imposed to censor not only the official speech of government scien-
tists, but also private speech.
6 Colin Macilwain & Geoff Brumfiel, US Scientists Fight Political Meddling, 439 NATURE
896, 896-97 (2006).
7 NASA Press Office Blasted for Overstepping the Mark, 439 NATURE 643, 643 (2006).8VOLOKH, supra note 1, at 2.
9 Id. at 224.
10 See id.
"' Id. at 195.
12 Id. at 194.
13 Id. at 314. The "narrowly tailored" requirement for time, place, and manner restric-
tions is considerably weaker than that used in strict scrutiny review. Id.
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This Essay will explore these issues starting with the level of pro-
tection that scientific speech warrants, followed by an analysis of how the
First Amendment rights of government scientists have been severely lim-
ited and, in some cases, potentially violated. The Essay will then present
an example of a prior restraint policy that is enforced by the EPA's
National Center for Environmental Assessment. This Essay will conclude
with recommendations on how the risks of censorship may be reduced in
order to allow government scientists to contribute their socially valuable
speech, as private citizens, with minimal interference to or from the
government.
I. SCIENTIFIC SPEECH AS HIGHLY PROTECTED SPEECH
A. Background
Few would argue that original scientific data or a "weight-of-the-
evidence" evaluation of data demonstrating potential human carcinoge-
nicity of a chemical used extensively in household products, for example,
would not be an issue of public concern. Such findings enable citizens to
make informed decisions with regard to their personal, as well as their
political, views. Although the publication of such information may initial-
ly take place in the peer-reviewed scientific literature, the findings will
inevitably flow through all major forms of media, ultimately reaching the
general population. Hence, censorship of information to the scientific com-
munity may result in censorship to the public as a whole.
Despite the seemingly obvious connections between scientific
speech and public concern, the legal system has not, for the most part,
defined the level of First Amendment protection that should be allocated
to scientific speech. In general, the case law that emerged over the course
of the twentieth century that touches upon the First Amendment and
scientific writings involves prior restraint in publishing and national
security violations under the Atomic Energy Act ("AEA") of 1954.14 Inter-
estingly, the first real challenge to the Government's censorship of scien-
tific speech came by way of a journalist, not a scientist. 15
14 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 1, 68 Stat. 919, 958 (1954) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (2007)) (prohibiting anyone from communicating, transmit-
ting, or disclosing any restricted data to any person with reason to believe such data will
be utilized to injure the United States or to secure an advantage to any foreign nation).
15 See United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F.Supp. 990, 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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B. United States v. The Progressive, Inc.
In 1979, Howard Morland gathered information available in the
public domain and drafted a manuscript entitled The H-Bomb Secret;
How We Got It, Why We're Telling It. 6 In the manuscript, Morland describ-
ed the essential design and operation of thermonuclear weapons." In
response to the Government's request, Federal District Judge Robert W.
Warren issued a temporary restraining order barring publication of the
manuscript in The Progressive on the grounds that the material was
classified, and that The Progressive, Inc., would be threatening national
security and violating the AEA by publishing the material."i Morland
argued that the manuscript was compiled to make the basic point that
"[s]ecrecy itself, especially the power of a few designated 'experts' to
declare some topics off limits, contributes to a political climate in which
the nuclear establishment can conduct business as usual, protecting and
perpetuating the production of these horror weapons." 9 Essentially, the
article was intended to inform the public of the "false illusion of security
created by the government's futile efforts at secrecy."" Morland believed
the publication would provide the American public with the "needed infor-
mation to make informed decisions on an urgent issue of public concern."2'
The District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin noted
that although the manuscript was probably not a "do-it yourself guide for
the hydrogen bomb," it could provide sufficient information for a country
to move faster with the development of a hydrogen weapon.22 Based on
the restrictions stated in Section 2274 of the AEA and the possible "grave,
direct, immediate and irreparable harm to the United States," the court con-
cluded, reluctantly, that the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the
publisher was warranted.2 The case was eventually dropped and, ironi-
cally, the government's attempt at censorship "resulted in the disclosure
of far more technical information than is contained in [the manuscript].'24
16 Id. at 990.
17 Id. at 993.
sId. at 990. See also Erwin Knoll, The 'Secret' Revealed, PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 1.
Howard Morland, The H-bomb Secret: To Know How is to Ask Why, PROGRESSIVE, Nov.
1979, at 3.
2 The Progressive, 467 F.Supp. at 994.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 993 ("[A] sine qua non to thermonuclear capability is a large, sophisticated
industrial capability coupled with a coterie of imaginative, resourceful scientists and
technicians. One does not build a hydrogen bomb in the basement.").
23 Id. at 996.
4 Knoll, supra note 18, at 1.
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This case not only highlighted the exaggerated stance the govern-
ment might take in acting as a sovereign over private citizens but also
the censorship that may be imposed on scientific writing. Unfortunately,
scientists' fear of penalties under the AEA effectively suppressed the
findings that radioactive fallout from above ground nuclear testing was
widespread, rather than localized as the Government claimed, prolonging
the Government's failure to warn the public in the 1950s and 1960s.25
It is noteworthy to contemplate the outcome if Morland had been
a government employee expressing public concern over a scientific issue
such as the H-bomb. Scientific speech from a private citizen, regardless
of employer, should be afforded the same level of protection as political
speech since government restrictions may stifle the growth of science in
the professional community and ultimately deprive not only the scientific
community, but also the general public of adequate information neces-
sary to make informed decisions.
II. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
It is generally accepted that the government, when acting as an
employer, may exert greater control over the expressions of its employ-
ees.26 This level of restriction may be higher than instances where the
government is acting as a sovereign over private citizens. A government
employee may be penalized for speech made as a private citizen on mat-
ters of public concern.2 ' A government employee may also be penalized
for speech on a matter of public concern that is expressed while perform-
ing in his or her official capacity.28 In both instances, the government aims
to restrict speech it views as contrary to the government's perceived
stance. For the better part of the 20th century, the unchallenged dogma
was that a public employee had no right to object to conditions placed on
employment, including those conditions that limit constitutional rights.29
2 See generally Allen v. United States, 588 F.Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984).
26 See VOLOKH, supra note 1, at 359.
27/d.
28 Id.
2 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144 (1983) (quoting McAuliffe v. City of New
Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892)).
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A. Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School
The Supreme Court clarified the rights of government employees
speaking as private citizens in 1968.30 In Pickering v. Board of Educa-
tion, the Court developed a two-part test for determining whether the
Government as an employer may infringe on the First Amendment rights
of its employees.31 Marvin Pickering, a teacher at the Township High
School District, was fired for writing and submitting a letter to the editor
of a newspaper.32 The letter was construed as an attack on the "School
Board's handling of the 1961 bond issue proposals and its subsequent
allocation of financial resources between the schools' educational and
athletic programs."33 The letter also charged the superintendent of schools
with "attempting to prevent teachers in the district from opposing or criti-
cizing the proposed bond issue."34
As a result, Pickering, a government employee, was dismissed
from his position.35 The School Board claimed that the letter contained
numerous false statements, damaged the reputations of the Board and
the school administration, and would "tend to foment 'controversy, conflict,
and dissension' among teachers, administrators, the Board of Education,
and the residents of the district."36 Pickering argued that his statements
were protected by the First Amendment.37 This argument was rejected,
however, "on the ground that his acceptance of a teaching position in the
public schools obliged him to refrain from making statements about the
operation of the schools 'which in the absence of such position he would
have an undoubted right to engage in. '
Despite numerous U.S. Supreme Court decisions to the contrary,
the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Pickering's claim that "he could not
constitutionally be dismissed from his teaching position" for speaking on
a matter of public interest, namely, the operation of public schools.39 On
30 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
31 See id.
32 Id. at 564.
3Id. at 566.
34id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 567.
37 id.
38 Id.
31 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967)
(finding that a statute making treasonable or seditious words or acts grounds for removal
from state employment was unconstitutional); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
730 [Vol. 31:725
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review, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed.4" The Court
recognized that a balancing must take place between "the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees."4'
The Pickering decision extends First Amendment protection to com-
munications made by government employees speaking as private citizens
on matters of public concern, provided that the damage the speech causes
to the government's operation is not outweighed by the value of the
speech to the employee and the public. Therefore, if a government em-
ployee speaks as a private citizen on a matter of private concern or if the
damage caused to the government's operation exceeds the value of the
speech, the government has carte blanche authority to do as it pleases.42
As a corollary, the categorization of scientific speech as a matter
of public concern is crucial for conveyances by government scientists to
be afforded protection by the First Amendment. Scientific information
that may first be accessible or understandable by only specialized audi-
ences, such as toxicologists or epidemiologists, may nevertheless be a
matter of public concern precisely because the scientific information's
applications may have real consequences for the public health and safety
of the national community, which requires informed citizenry to make
appropriate social choices.
B. Connick v. Myers
Although the Supreme Court has not had occasion to determine
the social value of scientific speech, the Court addressed what constitutes
a matter of public concern in Connick v. Myers.' In October of 1980,
(finding that a statute requiring school teachers to submit an annual affidavit, listing
organizations with which they were involved, was unconstitutional); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (finding that a statute requiring government employees
to take an oath of loyalty stating they had not associated with communist organizations
was unconstitutional).41 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
41 Id. at 568.
42 See id. at 573. But see N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723 (1971)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (acknowledging that embarrassment to the government was not
dispositive for overcoming the First Amendment).
' Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). But see Robert R. Kuehn, Suppression of
Environmental Science, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 333, 360-63 (2004); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Scientific Speach in the 1990s, 2 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 254, 260-75 (1993).
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Sheila Myers, an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans, Louisiana,
was notified by Harry Connick, her supervisor, that she was being trans-
ferred to another section." Myers was adamantly opposed to the transfer,
and in response, she prepared a questionnaire on her own time soliciting
the views of her colleagues on a variety of issues, including the "office
transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the
level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured
to work in political campaigns."45 The questionnaire was distributed to
her colleagues primarily during her lunch hour the following day.46
Another supervisor informed Connick that Myers had created a "mini-
insurrection" in the office.4 7 Thereafter, Connick terminated Myers be-
cause of her refusal to accept the transfer.48 In addition, she was told that
the distribution of the questionnaire was "an act of insubordination."49
Myers filed suit arguing that the real reason for her termination
was the questionnaire, which was protected speech under the First Amend-
ment.5" The trial court agreed with Myers and ordered that she be rein-
stated with "backpay, damages, and attorney's fees."51 Connick appealed,
and the appellate court affirmed on the basis of the trial court's findings.52
On review, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decision,
stating that "[wihether an employee's speech addresses a matter of
public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of
a given statement, as revealed by the whole record."53 With the exception
of the comment on "political campaigns," the Court found that the ques-
tionnaire did not "fall under the rubric of matters of public concern," and
refused to constitutionalize an employee grievance.'
Despite the Court's ruling in Connick, the Pickering decision
provides protection to speech on matters of public concern contributed by
government employees in their capacity as private citizens.55 After all,
government employees are the members of the community who are most
4 Id. at 140.45 Id. at 140-41.
46 Id. at 141.
47 Id.
4 id.
49 id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 142.
52 Id.
5 Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 148-49, 154.
55 See supra Section II.A.
[Vol. 31:725
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likely to have informed and definite opinions about the inner workings
of the government. However, as discussed below, government employees
may not be afforded First Amendment protection for speech on matters
of public concern that is made while working in their official capacity.
C. Garcetti v. Ceballos
In February of 2000, Richard Ceballos, a Deputy District Attorney
with the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, was asked by a
defense attorney to review "inaccuracies in an affidavit used to obtain a
critical search warrant."" The defense attorney had filed a motion to
challenge the warrant, but requested Ceballos' review.57 "Ceballos deter-
mined the affidavit contained serious misrepresentations," and followed
up by contacting a Deputy Sheriff at the Los Angeles County Sheriffs
Department." Unsatisfied with the Deputy Sheriffs explanation for the
perceived inaccuracies, Ceballos notified his supervisors, Carol Najera and
Frank Sundstedt, and drafted a disposition memorandum on March 2,
2000." 9 The memorandum expressed his concerns and recommended dis-
missal of the case.60
Subsequently, a meeting was held between members of the sher-
iffs department and Ceballos, Najera, and Sundstedt, which erupted into
a heated exchange.6' Despite Ceballos' concerns, Sundstedt opted to
proceed with the prosecution, pending an outcome to the challenged war-
rant. At a hearing on the motion to quash the warrant, Ceballos was
called by the defense to recount his observations about the affidavit, but
the trial court rejected the challenge. Soon thereafter, Ceballos claimed
that he was the victim of retaliatory employment actions, including a
"reassignment from his calendar deputy position to a trial deputy posi-
tion, transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a promotion."'
After being denied an employee grievance, Ceballos brought suit,
asserting that he was retaliated against in violation of his First and
56 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006).
57 id.
58 id.
59 Id. at 1955-56.
60 id.
61 Id. at 1956.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 id.
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Fourteenth Amendment rights because of the March 2 memorandum.65
The trial court disagreed, noting that Ceballos drafted the memo pur-
suant to his official duties, and therefore, was not afforded First Amend-
ment protection for its contents.66
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied upon
the balancing test set forth in Pickering, and whether the "expressions
in question were made by [Ceballos] as a citizen upon matters of public
concern," as determined by Connick.67 The court concluded that Ceballos'
memorandum was "inherently a matter of public concern."' However,
the issue of whether Ceballos' speech was made as a private citizen was
not addressed.69 Instead, the court relied on Ninth Circuit precedent that
rejected the idea that "a public employee's speech is deprived of First
Amendment protection whenever those views are expressed, to govern-
ment workers or others, pursuant to an employment responsibility."70 It
should be noted that one judge specially concurred, stating that "when
public employees speak in the course of carrying out their routine, re-
quired employment obligations, they have no personal interest in the
content of that speech that gives rise to a First Amendment right."7
On review, the Supreme Court recognized that "[glovernment
employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control
over their employees' words and actions; without it, there would be little
chance for the efficient provision of public service. "72 Relying on Pickering
and Connick, the Court held that"... when public employees make state-
ments pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking
as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not
insulate their communications from employer discipline."73
65 
Id.
6 6 
id.
67 Id. at 1956.
68 id.
69 id.
70 Id. (quoting Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1174-75 (2004)). The Ninth Circuit
precedent relied upon by the Court of Appeals included, among other cases, Roth v.
Veteran's Admin. of Govt. of U. S., 856 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1988). Id.
71 Id. at 1957.
72 Id. at 1958.
73 Id. at 1960.
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III. GOVERNMENT SCIENTISTS AND PEER-REVIEWED SCIENTIFIC SPEECH
Within the scientific realm, peer review serves as a measure for
the accuracy and consistency of scientific speech. Peer review entails the
critical review of a work product that is conducted by a limited number
of individuals who possess equivalent technical expertise to those who
drafted the original work.74 Historically, peer review has been the sine
qua non of the scientific literature and was incorporated in many of the
offices within federal agencies upon their creation. For instance, EPA's
Office of Research and Development has utilized peer review since 1970,
and has had a formal peer review policy in place since 1982. 7" However,
peer review has not been prominent or uniform across the different of-
fices within EPA.76 The existence of such inconsistency has led to repeat-
ed accusations that many of EPA's regulatory decisions possess a poor
scientific basis." Moreover, the 1992 report entitled Safeguarding the
Future: Credible Science, Credible Decisions found that a perception
existed that "EPA lacked adequate safeguards to prevent the unaccept-
able practice of adjusting science to fit policy."7 In response to recom-
mendations in the 1992 report, the EPA Administrator issued a Peer
Review Policy in 1993, which included a strengthened and expanded
peer-review process for Agency activities.79 Subsequently, the EPA's Peer
Review Handbook was issued in 1998, with the second and third editions
being issued in 2000 and 2006, respectively. 0
The third edition of the EPA's Peer Review Handbook provides
guidance for EPA scientists that wish to submit a work product to a peer-
reviewed scientific journal."' It should be noted that use of the term "work
product" connotes an article developed in a scientist's official capacity as
74 U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, PEER REVIEW HANDBOOK 12 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter PEER
REVIEW HANDBOOK] ("Peer review is usually characterized by a one-time interaction or
a limited number of interactions by independent peer reviewers.").
75 COMM. ON RESEARCH AND PEER REVIEW IN EPA ET AL., STRENGTHENING SCIENCE AT
THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: RESEARCH-MANAGEMENT AND PEER-
REVIEW PRACTICES 102 (2000).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 102-103 (referring to EXPERT PANEL ON THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AT EPA,
SAFEGUARDING THE FUTURE: CREDIBLE SCIENCE, CREDIBLE DECISIONS (1992)).7 1 Id. at 103.
80 See Environmental Protection Agency, Peer Review Program, http://www.epa.gov/
peerreview (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
81 PEER REVIEW HANDBOOK, supra note 74, at 47.
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a government employee. 2 The handbook states "EPA considers peer re-
view by [peer-reviewed scientific] journals as adequate for reviewing the
scientific credibility and validity of the findings (or data) in that article,
and therefore, a satisfactory form of peer review."83 In addition, EPA
scientists are encouraged to have their articles internally peer-reviewed
prior to submitting to a journal for peer review. 4 The handbook further
explains that "[a]rticles may also need examination in accordance with
any organizational clearance procedures, especially when the author is
presenting him or herself as an EPA employee."8"
In light of the recent holding in Ceballos, the above policy on the
level of peer review that should be applied to articles destined for sub-
mission to scientific journals that are drafted by government scientists
working in their official capacity leaves little, if any, room for dispute.
While most scientists welcome preliminary critical reviews of their work,
as the reviewers may identify possible errors or oversights that could
lead to rejection during a journal's peer review process, there are poten-
tial drawbacks to this process.8 6 For example, preliminary peer review
rapidly loses its value when the reviews take weeks or months to com-
plete. If a policy of review is in place that leaves the completion time
open-ended, government scientists will be less compelled to contribute
articles to peer-reviewed scientific journals. Additionally, if the peer re-
viewer serves a dual role as a supervisor or a clearance officer, and there
is a difference of opinion, the article may be subject to prepublication
restriction. Regrettably, the clearance policy enforced by the EPA's
National Center for Environmental Assessment ("NCEA") suffers from
precisely these types of problems.
IV. PRIOR RESTRAINT AND CENSORSHIP OF GOVERNMENT SCIENTISTS
A. Prior Restraint and Censorship of Government Scientists
On December 4, 2003, the Center Director of NCEA issued a
memorandum on "Clearance Procedures for NCEA Work Products.""7 The
8 2
Id°
3 Id.
84
1d.
85 id.
' See Peter M. Chapman, When is Peer Review Excessive? Examples of Peer Review Hell,
12 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 423, 423-26 (2006); see also Amy Mills, IRIS
from the Inside, 26 RISK ANAL. 1409, 1410 (2006).
87 Memorandum from the Director of the Natl Center for Envtl. Assessment to NCEA
Staff, Clearance Procedures for NCEA Work Products 1 (Dec. 4, 2003).
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memorandum categorized NCEA work products and specified those that
must be cleared by the Center Director versus those that may require
lesser review if there are no policy implications.8 The following reasons
were given as driving the imposition of additional levels of review above
and beyond those prescribed in the EPA's Peer Review Handbook:
1) To ensure our work products are of the highest quality;
2) To evaluate the potential policy implications and
impacts of NCEA work products; and
3) To ensure that ORD and Agency management are
provided a "heads-up" concerning work products
that may be of a high level of interest to the public
and other stakeholders. 9
Interestingly, journal manuscripts were classified as not having
to go through the full chain of command to the Center Director, and were
subcategorized into those with and those without policy implications. °
However, the memorandum explains that:
[Gliven the nature of [the] work in NCEA, [the Center
Director's] default position (i.e., the "presumption of policy
philosophy") on work products about chemical risk and
risk methods, is that they have policy implications and
therefore require [the Center Director's] approval before
being submitted to [a] journal for consideration. 9 '
The clearance chain for work products detailed in the memoran-
dum contains four levels of review.92 However, depending on the division
within NCEA, manuscripts submitted through this clearance process may
8Id. at 3-4.
89 d. at 1.
9Id. at3.
91 d. at 3.
92Id. at 2. The clearance path is listed as follows: "1. Group Chief/Branch Chief(lst level
supervisor); 2. Division Director (including staff directors for IRIS, Global Change and
Risk Assessment Forum); 3. Associate Directors (Associate for Health for human health
documents and Associate for Ecology for ecological reports); [and] 4. Center Director/
Deputy Director." Id.
2007] 737
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have up to seven levels of review before they are cleared.93 Even though
this process states that it applies only to NCEA work products, it has been
applied to manuscripts written by employees in their capacities as pri-
vate citizens produced during non-duty hours.94
As mentioned above, preliminary critical review can be a valuable
service to the scientist eager to publish his or her work. The reviews per-
formed in anticipation of clearance are not likely to be valuable, however,
because the NCEA memorandum does not provide for consistency within
the review process. The evaluation of each manuscript is left up to the
prejudices and whims of each reviewing official, who has the authority to
block the manuscript's progression.95 Although it has not been formally
challenged, this policy of prior restraint that has escalated to censorship
on publishing appears to violate the First Amendment rights of govern-
ment scientists who wish to contribute articles written outside of their
official duty hours. The extensive clearance process is far above and
beyond those encouraged in the EPA's Peer Review Handbook, yet fails
to advance the interests of the government in a direct and material way.
As stated by the Supreme Court, "[t]he First Amendment directs us to be
93 Manuscripts submitted by Integrated Risk Information System ("IRIS") scientists have
to be cleared through the following superiors: 1. Team Leader; 2. IRIS Program Director;
3. Peer-Review Coordinator; 4. Special Assistant to the Director; 5. Associate Director of
Health; 6. Deputy Director for Management; and 7. Center Director. See id.
14 The author was told that if he wanted to submit a manuscript to a law review that
included a brief biographical sketch, including past and present employment, education,
etc., he was required to send the article through clearance. Alternatively, he was told that
he could submit the article to a law review if he removed any mention of EPA, despite the
fact that a prominent disclaimer was to be placed on the cover page and that the man-
uscript was written outside of his duty hours. See Todd Stedeford & Amanda S. Persad,
The Influence of Carcinogenicity Classification and Mode of Action Characterization on
Distinguishing 'Like Products' Under Article 111:4 of the GATT and Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement, 15 N.Y.U. ENV'L L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
" The author has first-hand experience of the inefficiency and disorganization of this
system. A manuscript entitled The Application ofNon-Default Uncertainty Factors in the
U.S. EPA's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) that he co-authored and submitted
for clearance in February of 2006 (intended for a peer-reviewed scientific journal) was still
in clearance as of July 19, 2006. Several sections were required to be removed during the
first-round of clearance review that were later identified as necessary elements by subse-
quent reviewers. After repeated complaints by the authors about the management's timely
review, the management stated on July 20, 2006, that the paper had policy implications.
Since this time, two of the EPA co-authors requested that their names be removed from
the manuscript. Further, the corresponding author of that manuscript, Dr. Ching-Hung
Hsu, has since left the Agency because of the draconian restrictions placed on publishing.
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especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government perceives to be their own good."96
Prior restraint is defined as a "governmental restriction on speech
or publication before its actual expression."97 This is by far the most efficient
means of controlling the free flow of information, and the Government can
exercise this right, when acting as an employer, over its employee's official
communications. Codified exceptions are available for government em-
ployees acting in their capacity as private citizens. For instance, EPA
provides procedural requirements for its employees wishing to engage in
activities outside their official capacity, including "writing when done
under an arrangement with another person for production or publication
of the written product."98 Approval is required when the subject matter
"deals in significant part with the policies, programs or operations of
EPA or any matter to which the employee presently is assigned or to
which the employee has been assigned during the previous one-year
period."99 The standard for approval is that approval should be made
"only upon a determination that the outside employment is not expected
to involve conduct prohibited by statute or Federal regulation, including
5 C.F.R. part 2635 [Standards of ethical conduct for employees of the
executive branch] and § 6401.102 [Prohibited financial interests] ."'o
Offices within the EPA have tailored these procedural requirements
to suit their staff. For example, NCEA's official memorandum entitled Re-
quest for Approval to Engage in Outside Employment or Other Outside
Activity states that "approval must be obtained in advance of initiating
or committing to the performance of this activity."10 ' When a requested
activity includes writing for publication, the following also applies:
" 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996).
97 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (8th ed. 2004) ("Prior restraints violate the First
Amendment unless the speech is obscene, is defamatory, or creates a clear and present
danger to society.").
98 5 C.F.R. § 6401.103 (2007).
99 Id. § 6401.103(a)(4).
'0o Id. § 6401.103(c).
'01 Memorandum from Nat'l Center for Envtl. Assessment to NCEA Staff, Request for
Approval to Engage in Outside Employment or Other Outside Activity (n.d.) [hereinafter
Outside Employment Memorandum]. It should be noted that "employment" does not
include participation in educational activities. 5 C.F.R. § 6401.103(e). The author drafted
this manuscript as part of a course requirement on the First Amendment. Hence, no
outside employment form was required.
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[Employee] certif[ies] that [he or she] will not use or permit
the use of [his or her] official title or position to identify
[employee] in connection with this activity ... except as
one of several biographical details in connection with an
article published in a scientific or professional journal,
provided that the title or position is accompanied by a
reasonably prominent disclaimer indicating that the views
expressed do not necessarily represent the views of the
agency or the US.1"2
A critical issue with the above restriction is the use of the title or
position of the government employee. In scientific writing, the inclusion
of an author's professional affiliation serves two important purposes.
First, it provides a means of identification. Second, it aids with the
reader's evaluation of possible bias or conflicts of interest, financial or
otherwise, that may permeate the article. According to the regulation
above, a government scientist who wishes to contribute his or her thoughts
on a particular matter to a peer-reviewed scientific journal is allowed to
use their title or position for institutional identification as long as it is
suffixed with a disclaimer. °3 The inclusion of a disclaimer distinguishes
the author's speech from that of the government. Hence, approval needed
for an outside activity such as the submission of a manuscript for pub-
lication should not be subject to an extensive clearance process that might
potentially delay its submission, perhaps indefinitely, or result in outright
censorship of a manuscript. It is important to keep in mind that scientific
manuscripts intended for peer-reviewed scientific journals are subjected
to a peer review process by the journal that is independent of the review
performed within the divisions of EPA. Therefore, the application of a
prominent disclaimer should be more than adequate for curing any
concerns that clearance officials may have.
B. Pearson v. Shalala10 4
Perhaps the best example of disclaimers being used to protect
speech arose from case law addressing the Food and Drug Administra-
tion's ("FDA") restrictions on health claims listed on the labels of dietary
102 Outside Employment Memorandum, supra note 101, at 3.
103 Id.
104 164 F.3d 650 (U.S. App. D.C. 1999).
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supplements. FDA has authority to require companies to obtain FDA's
approval prior to marketing a dietary supplement that includes a "health
claim" on the label.1 °5 This is the primary regulatory hurdle that
marketers of these products face. Although the Supreme Court has not
considered this subject, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit addressed this matter in Pearson v. Shalala in 1999.10 Durk
Pearson, a marketer of dietary supplements, asked FDA to authorize
several health claims, including the following: ".8 mg of folic acid in a
dietary supplement is more effective in reducing the risk of neural tube
defects than a lower amount in foods in common form.""' FDA rejected
this health claim stating "the scientific literature does not support the
superiority of any one source over others."' In addition, FDA refused to
permit the health claim along with the following corrective disclaimer:
"The FDA has determined that the evidence supporting this claim is
inconclusive."0 9 In FDA's view, "the disclaimer approach would be inef-
fective because 'there would be a question as to whether consumers would
be able to ascertain which claims were preliminary [and accompanied by
a disclaimer] and which were not."'110
Pearson argued that FDA's refusal to consider the health claim
with an appropriate disclaimer was a violation of the First Amend-
ment."' In response, FDA advanced two arguments. First, they stated
that approval of the health claim with a disclaimer would be inherently
misleading. Second, even if the disclaimer option was only "potentially
misleading," FDA still had no obligation to consider it in lieu of an
outright ban."2 Since expressions on the labels of commercial products
are afforded diminished protection under the First Amendment, the
Court evaluated Pearson's claim using a three-part test articulated by
the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission
105 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(2007). A"health claim" is defined as a "claim made on the label or in
labeling of... a dietary supplement that expressly or by implication... characterizes the
relationship of any substance to a disease or health-related condition." Id. § 101.14(a)(1).
'
6 Pearson, 164 F.3d 650.
10 7 Id. at 652.
108 Id. at 654 (quoting Health Claims and Label Statements, 61 Fed. Reg. 8752, 8760
(Mar. 5, 1996)).
'
0 9 Id. at 654.
1 Id. at 653 (quoting General Requirements for Health Claims for Dietary Supplements,
59 Fed. Reg. 395, 405 (Jan. 4, 1994)).
'11 Id. at 654.112 Id. at 655.
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of New York for evaluating a government scheme to regulate potentially
misleading commercial speech. 113
The Central Hudson test (as it is commonly known) begins by
asking "whether the asserted government interest is substantial," and
"whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted.""' The final inquiry determines whether the fit between the
government's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends "is
not necessarily perfect, but reasonable."" 5 In the Pearson case, the court
answered the first question in the affirmative, recognizing that the
Supreme Court has stated "that there is no question that [the govern-
ment's] interest in ensuring the accuracy of commercial information in
the marketplace is substantial""6 and the "government has a substantial
interest in 'promoting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.'"" 7
However, the court found that FDA's regulatory scheme encountered
difficulties with the second and third questions under Central Hudson.
The court recognized that FDA did not assert that the dietary supple-
ments in question "in any fashion threaten[ed] consumer's health and
safety.""' The court did, however, recognize the "government's interest
in preventing consumer fraud/confusion may well take on added im-
portance in the context of a product such as dietary supplements, that
can affect the public's health.""9 However, the Court noted that the
consumer fraud justification failed on the third question. 2 ° The Court
relied on holdings from the Supreme Court that "the preferred remedy
[for potentially misleading advertisements] is more disclosure, rather
than less"'2' and that disclaimers are constitutionally preferable to
outright suppression.'22 The Court did not attempt to draft disclaimers,
but they did state that FDA should have done so.'23
' Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 561 (1980)).
114 Id. at 656 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566).
1 5Id. (quoting Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y.v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
"
6 Id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993)).
"
7 Id. (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995)).
118 Id.
1 9 Id. at 656.
120 id.
121 Id. at 657 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)).
122 Id. (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206 (1982); Peel v. Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990)).
123 Id. at 659.
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C. Disclaimers and NCEA Policy
EPA's Office of Research and Development ("ORD") foresaw the
need for its scientists to be able to submit independent research
performed outside their working hours, and in June of 1991, issued the
Technical Information Policy and Guide of the Office of Research and
Development.'" This document requested that manuscripts drafted by EPA
employees during non-worktime include the following disclaimer:
The research described herein was developed by the author,
an employee of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), on his/her own time. It was conducted independent
of EPA employment and has not been subjected to the
Agency's peer and administrative review. Therefore, the
conclusions and opinions drawn are solely those of the
author and are not necessarily the views of the Agency.'25
In March of 2003, NCEA revised the disclaimers listed in Appen-
dix F of the Technical Information Policy and Guide of the Office of
Research and Development, and stated that EPA employees should "use
ORD disclaimers where applicable, but use the disclaimers/notices provi-
ded ... for NCEA products that are not covered in [the Guide]."126 Since
the revised list of Disclaimers for NCEA Use does not address manu-
scripts authored by EPA employees during non-duty hours, it is clear
that the ORD disclaimers are to be used.
CONCLUSION
In order to obtain First Amendment protection, government em-
ployees must ensure that their speech meets several requirements. First,
the speech must relate to a matter of public concern.'27 If the expression
addresses a matter of public concern, the courts will examine whether or
not the expressions were made by the government employee acting as a
'24 OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/9-91/004,
TECHNICAL INFORMATION POLICY AND GuIDE OF THE OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT (1991). NCEA is part of ORD.
125 Id. at 43.
126 Natl Center for Envtl. Assessment, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Disclaimers for NCEA
Use 1 (Mar. 2003) (on file with author).
.
27 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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private citizen or as an employee performing official government duties.128
If the expressions are made as a private citizen, a court will proceed to bal-
ancing the potential interferences with the government's ability to perform
its operations efficiently and the employee's interest in being allowed to
comment on the subject.129 In contrast, if the expressions are made as a
part of official duties, then the Government is free to regulate them. 13
Despite the holding in Pickering, government employees do not
have free reign to publish as private citizens. If the subject matter is
significantly related to the employee's agency or official duties, prior
approval may be required to ensure that the activity or speech will not
violate ethical or financial responsibilities placed on the citizen as a
government employee. Such requirements for engaging in outside activi-
ties are not offensive to the First Amendment given that the reasons
listed for denying approval are established as safeguards to ensure there
is no violation of the government employee's fiduciary obligation to the
government from the expressions made by the employee as a private
citizen.' 3 ' When government managers deny an activity for reasons other
than those expressly stated, however, potential violations of First Amend-
ment rights may result.
For contributions that are outside the enumerated examples of
"outside activities," a government employee has the option of submitting
a manuscript to a peer-reviewed journal without describing his or her
professional affiliation (in which case a financial disclosure will often be
required that identifies the author as a government employee), or inclu-
ding his or her affiliation with an appropriate disclaimer. The latter
option is generally preferable, as it will satisfy any questions about poten-
tial conflicts of interest and serves as a source of identification for the
author. The Pearson court provided some insight for addressing situa-
tions involving disclaimers and restrictions on speech by the government,
stating that it was up to the agency to draft the disclaimers. 32
Clearly, the EPA addressed the use and application of disclaimers
so that government scientists may publish at will in the peer-reviewed
literature as private citizens with professional affiliations. This is a par-
ticularly appealing option as it avoids the chilling effects on speech that
12 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. Of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
129 See id.
"3 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
131Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (finding that a former CIA agent breached
his fiduciary obligation by failing to submit material concerning the CIA for pre-
publication review).
"' See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (U.S. App. D.C. 1999).
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an excessive pre-clearance review system may ultimately cause. This is
important given that any manuscript submitted to peer-reviewed scien-
tific journal will undergo peer review. If the manuscript survives this
process, it will eventually be published and subjected to an even more
extensive degree of scrutiny by the scientific community as a whole.
One final point should be made with regard to disclaimers and
scientific publications written by government employees on their own
time, but utilizing their professional affiliations. This point stems from
a piece of wisdom expressed by the Pearson court. When addressing FDA's
contention that "[H] ealth claims lacking 'significant scientific agreement'
are inherently misleading because they have such an awesome impact on
consumers as to make it virtually impossible for them to exercise any
judgment at the point of sale," the court stated that "[iit would be as if
the consumers were asked to buy something while hypnotized, and
therefore they are bound to be misled. We think this contention is almost
frivolous."133 The above passage has a similar analogue for the draconian
clearance policies thought necessary by some government officials. It
seems that they view the contributions by their scientists, expressed as
private citizens, to be so impactful and potentially misleading to readers
that it is necessary to remove any and all unintended meanings from
each document prior to submission for peer review in a scientific journal.
Review and clearance handled in such a way not only contradicts EPA's
guidance documents, but also infringes on the First Amendment rights
of EPA scientists.
"
3 3 Id. at 655.
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